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How Coupled Are Decoupled
Farm Payments?
A Review of the Evidence
Arathi Bhaskar and John C. Beghin
This survey paper explores the literature on decoupling of farm programs that has
emerged in the last 10 years. The paper identifies and assesses the various channels
of potential coupling of decoupled farm payments and provides a taxonomy of
coupling mechanisms found in theoretical and empirical papers. Coupling of
decoupled payments is pervasive but effects when measurable are small, with the
exception of the impact on land values. The paper points to unresolved issues on
potential coupling mechanisms for further research.

Key words: agricultural policy, decoupled, decoupling, farm payment programs,
program subsidies, support

Introduction
Domestic subsidies to agriculture were brought under the discipline of global trade rules
for the first time in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Member countries of the WTO decided to reduce the
distortions that were caused by current levels of domestic farm subsidies. Under the
URAA, domestic support is classified into three categories or "boxes" according to their
impact on international trade. The amber box contains the most distorting subsidies,
which are therefore required to be limited in use. The blue-box payments also cause
some distortion but are required to be production limiting. The green box contains
subsidies that cause no or minimal distortion. The subsidies in the blue and green boxes
are excluded from all WTO disciplines. To reduce trade distortions caused by these farm
subsidies, members were required to shift toward decoupled income support while
reducing coupled support. Decoupled support policies are categorized as green-box
payments. They are defined as payments that are fmanced by taxpayers and are not
related to current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility criteria are
defined by a fixed, historical base period. Since they are exempt from WTO disciplines,
decoupled payments have become an important part of income support provided to
agriculture, especially in industrialized countries.
Developing countries and natural exporters of agricultural goods have "resisted" the
established leadership of the EU and United States in WTO negotiations. New coalitions
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such as the Cairns group and the various Gs groups are questioning farm subsidies in
many industrialized countries. 1 All subsidies will eventually be scrutinized. Beyond
amber- and blue-box payments, green-box payments have been discussed during negotiations, although no limits have been set on the table. The 2003 Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) reforms with their new decoupled Single Farm Payment (SFP) and the
attempts by the United States to boost green-box payments to offset expected reductions
in amber- and blue-box support are viewed suspiciously by many developing countries
as a more hidden way to foster agricultural production and trade.
Green-box payments are likely to be central to the round following the Doha round.
This evolution of the WTO agricultural negotiations is occurring in the context of recent
WTO rulings against Canadian dairy, EU sugar, and U.S. cotton policies, all three
shown to be distorting and inconsistent with WTO obligations. The U.S. cotton dispute
also put the U.S. direct payments inclusion in the green box into question, although the
latter were not initially a focus of the dispute. Many countries with large farm programs
are pushing their own interest groups to consider less coupled policies or decoupled
policies fitting under generously defined blue and green boxes under a new WTO agreement at the conclusion of the Doha round. The policy debate has led to various claims
and conjectures to explain the link between decoupled payments and production
decisions and market outcomes (Aksoy and Beghin, 2004). The economics profession has
recently addressed and delineated many of these potential links, both with analytical
conceptualizations and empirical investigations. This large body of work, accumulated
in the last 10 years, motivates taking stock and evaluating what has been settled and
what is left to elucidate.
Our survey paper distills the recent literature on decoupling offarm programs in the
last 10 years, building on a previous survey by Abler and Blandford (2005). We first
describe the ambiguity surrounding "decoupling," then assess the various channels of
potential coupling of decoupled farm payments and provide a taxonomy of coupling
mechanisms found in theoretical and empirical papers. The majority of the papers
reviewed find that decoupled payments affect the decision-making process of farmers,
though most effects are small in magnitude. This paper identifies unresolved issues on
"coupling mechanisms" for further research. The following programs have been
considered here: the production flexibility contract (PFC) payments from the 1996
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act which have been continued
as direct payments in the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act and the
counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) in the United States, and the CAP area payments in
theEU.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section below provides two
important definitions of decoupled payments and identifies the coupling mechanisms
of decoupled payments. The next six sections are devoted to a review of the recent
literature, classifying papers by the specific mechanism. The fmal section offers our
fmdings and conclusions. An appendix presents tables providing summary highlights
of the papers reviewed in each of the six literature discussion sections.
1 The Group of20 or G20, with variations ofG21, G22, and G20+, represents a coalition of developing economies established
in 2003 just before the 5th Ministerial WTO conference, held in CancUn, Mexico. The Group seeks to break the US·EU
dominance on WTO negotiations. It currently includes: in Africa-Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe;
in Asia-China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand; and in Latin America-Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Definition of Decoupled Payments
and Coupling Mechanisms
Two prominent defmitions of"decoupled" payments are based on the URAA (as defined
in Annex 2.6) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The URAA defines decoupling in terms of policy design as taxpayer-fmanced payments
satisfying the following criteria:
• Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly defined criteria such
as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a
defined and fixed base period.
• The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based
on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the
producer in any year after the base period.
• The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based
on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken
in any year after the base period.
• The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based
on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period.
• No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.
The OECD defines decoupling in terms of policy effects (Cahill, 1997). A policy is "fully
decoupled" if "it does not influence production decisions offarmers receiving payments."
Beyond unchanged market equilibrium, market adjustment to any exogenous shocks
should not be affected either. Both the shape and the position of supply and demand
curves are unchanged. A less restrictive concept, "effectively fully decoupled," means
that equilibrium levels of production and trade are unchanged but the shape of the
demand and supply curves can change.
While some payments may narrowly satisfy the URAA definition, they potentially
have some allocative ("coupling") effects, which arise with uncertainty, imperfect credit,
land and labor markets, and farmer expectations about future payments. In the
presence of uncertainty, decoupled payments reduce risk aversion and the degree of
risk. If credit markets are imperfect, decoupled payments have the potential to increase
the liquidity of credit-constrained farmers. The payments also increase land values and
rents, which also improves the creditworthiness of credit-constrained farmers and
provides incentives to retain land in agriculture. Decoupled payments affect labor
markets by influencing the on- and off-farm labor supply decisions. Decoupled payments
affect farmer expectations by linking current decisions to future payments. Next, we
review each coupling mechanism. Appendix tables AI-A6 summarize the results from
the literature according to the coupling mechanisms, the evidence of their magnitude
when available, and associated authors.

Coupling Through Risk
If farmers' preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), increases
in wealth imply a reduction in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (wealth effect).
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Decoupled payments also reduce the degree of risk faced by farmers by reducing income
variability (insurance effect) (Hennessy, 1998). Hennessy models a risk-averse farmer,
maximizing expected utility from profit. The farmer earns stochastic profit from the
market, which is augmented by a decoupled payment. The farmer's objective function
is given by:

(1)

maxfbU(ft(ex, <p, e»)dJ(e),
IX

a

where ex is the farmer's choice variable, ft(ex, <p, e) is the sum of stochastic market returns
ft(ex, e) and decoupled support payment DP(<p, e). Under the conditions that (a) the
farmer's preferences display DARA, (b) the risk faced by the farmer reduces his optimal
level of the choice variable (ft UE > 0), (c) support-augmented income increases with risk
«ftE(ex, <p, e) > 0), and (d) the decoupled payment reduces the risk faced by the farmer
(DPlpE(<P, e) ~ 0), the optimal choice of the farmer increases with the magnitude of support.
Hennessy also shows that under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and conditions
(b), (c), and (d), the optimal choice of the farmer increases with the magnitude of
support. In this case, wealth effects are absent; the optimal choice is influenced only by
insurance effects due to the reduced income variability induced by the increase in
support. Hennessy conducts a numerical analysis for a continuous corn producer in the
Midwest to obtain some measure of the magnitudes of the wealth and insurance effects
of a target price program based on fixed yield. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that an
increase in the magnitude of support could increase nitrogen use by a maximum of 15%,
while the increase in output is small (a maximum of2. 75%). Insurance effects are much
larger than wealth effects. To ensure that decoupled payments do not have any insurance effects, Hennessy suggests these payments should not vary with the source of
uncertainty.
Sckokai and Moro (2006) report findings similar to those of Hennessy (1998). Using
data from the Italian Farm Accounting Data Network, they empirically evaluate the
risk effects of the recent CAP reforms in the EU. It is assumed that risk arises due to
uncertain prices and that farmers display constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences. The estimated model is then used to simulate the effects of recent CAP
reforms (reduced intervention prices compensated by an increase in cereal area payments and eventually SFP). Supplies of all arable crops are positively influenced by
own-area payments. The elasticity of crop acreage with respect to area payments is
positive for all arable crops. The introduction of the nonstochastic SFP reduces income
variability and offsets the impact of the increased price variability. Risk effects are
decomposed into insurance and wealth effects. Additionally, the policy change has price
and payment effects which offset each other; while the wealth effects are positive but
small, insurance effects are more important in determining the direction of the output
effect of the policy change.
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2000) study the linkage between decoupled payments and production in the United States, Canada, and Mexico under uncertainty.
They apply a three-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in which the
effect of the decoupled payment on production is captured through a change in the risk
premium. Using 1997 data, the authors look at PFC in the United States, National
Income Stabilization Accounts (NISAs) in Canada (an effectively coupled payment),
and Procampo in Mexico, and analyze risk in returns for corn, wheat, feed grains, and
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oilseeds. They abstract from risk management such as hedging or off-farm employment.
Farmers in the United States and Canada are assumed to tolerate loss twice as often
compared to farmers in Mexico. The study examines the effect of a 50% increase in
decoupled payments on risk premia. Risk premia decrease, though the effects on output
via the decreased risk premia are small. U.S. output of oilseeds rises by 1.1%, and output of wheat rises by 0.5%. Mexican output of wheat and feed grains increases by 0.7%,
while the output of oilseeds falls by 0.3%, reflecting the shift in resources into more
risky crops.
Young and Westcott (2000) examine U.S. PFC payments, crop and revenue insurance,
marketing loans, and disaster assistance payments and their effect on production.
Assuming wealth elasticities of acreage between 0.087 and 0.270 (from Chavas and Holt,
1990), the authors calculate the production impact ofPFC payments on program crops
(corn, barley, oats, sorghum, rice, wheat, and upland cotton). PFC payments increased
aggregate acreage by 0.18 to 0.57 million acres annually, translating into a maximum
increase in acreage of 2% over the period 1996-2002. A shift of acreage toward riskier
crops and regions also occurred.
Anton and Le MoutH (2004) employ a mean-variance approach to compute the magnitude of the risk effects of CCP. They model a risk-averse farmer producing a single
output facing stochastic prices. Her income, M, is given by the sum of stochastic profits,
CCP, and off-farm income. The farmer maximizes the certainty equivalent income with
respect to outputy. The first-order condition yields the price risk premium:
oV(M)

(2)

E[ max{LR,p)] * 1-

oy

=C',

E[max(LR -)] * [2E(M) + V(M)]
,p
R
E(M)
r

where LR is the commodity loan rate,p is the stochastic output price, E(M) is expected
income, V(M) is the variance of income, Rr is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and
C' is marginal cost. The second term in brackets captures the price risk premium. The
incentive price is defined as the expected price given the truncation of the price distribution at the loan rate less the price risk premium. A policy that decreases the price risk
premium increases the incentive price and has a positive effect on production. Computing
the price risk premium under normally distributed prices, Anton and Le MouEH evaluate
the risk-related incentives for major commodities expressed as a percentage of the
market price of the commodity. The assumed value of Rr matters but effects are overall
small. The CCP program created risk-related effects in the magnitude of 0.9% for
sorghum, 1.5% for corn, and 1.9% for wheat.
Serra et al. (2005a) analyze the impact of decoupled payments on production decisions
taken at both the intensive and extensive levels in the presence of price uncertainty.
The model assumes that farmers have two sources of income: market revenue from sales
of a single output and decoupled payments (DP). The farmer maximizes expected utility
from wealth. The analysis is based on the assumption of DARA. The authors derive
expressions for the elasticity of output with respect to DP and the elasticity of output
with respect to (stochastic) price. Both the elasticities are found to be analytically positive, indicating that increases in both DP and price increase output. While DP increases
output only by reducing risk, a higher price raises output by increasing marginal income
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and by reducing risk. The authors specify a single aggregate output produced using two
variable inputs, chemical inputs and fertilizers, and use farm-level data for the years
1998-2001 from Kansas, and national-level aggregate data. Results indicate that the
DP elasticity is near zero and smaller than the price elasticity, with the former equal
to 0.006. Further, a reduction in price support, compensated exactly by an increase in
decoupled payments, leads to a small reduction in output. Finally, the elimination of
PFC payments would cause 6% of the farmers to exit.
In a related paper, Serra et al. (2006) analyze the impact of decoupled payments on
production by explicitly considering the effect that inputs have on output variability
when farmers face both output and price risk. For the single output/single input model,
an increase in DP increases (decreases) the demand for the input if the farmer's
preferences display DARA (increasing absolute risk aversion) and the input is risk
increasing. This occurs because the impact of DP on input use is determined by an
interaction between the wealth effect (caused by the change in the coefficient of risk
aversion brought about by a change in wealth) and the effect of the input on output
variability. If the input is risk decreasing, the effect ofDP on input use is indeterminate.
The effect of an increase in price on input demand is also indeterminate. Using a model
with three inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, and seeds and fuel oil) and the data of Serra
et al. (2005a), the authors find that all inputs are risk increasing and that farmers in
the sample exhibit DARA preferences. DP elasticities for the three inputs are positive,
but statistically insignificant. Price elasticities for the inputs are positive, though only
the elasticities for pesticide and fertilizer are statistically significant. A reduction in
price support which is compensated by a decoupled payment may lead to a decrease in
output mean and variance by reducing the use of risk-increasing inputs.
Makki, Johnson, and Somwaru (2005) analyze the effects ofCCPs on farm-level income
variability, crop choice, and acreage allocation decisions by simulating an expected
utility maximization model for a risk-averse representative Minnesota farmer facing
price and output uncertainty. The farmer is assumed to buy revenue or yield insurance.
The authors compare the certainty equivalent of the terminal period wealth under
different assumptions about programs, acreage allocations, and market conditions. The
simulation exercise is conducted for the years 2002-04. Results indicate that CCPs
increase farm welfare considerably, especially in low price years. Farmers may increase
acreage of crops with higher CCP rates, especially if base updating is allowed, as it was
under the 2002 FSRI Act.
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) econometrically evaluate the effect of PFC and market
loss assistance (MLA) payments on farm-level decisions using farm-level data from
USDA's Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) for the period 1998-2001.
They investigate the impact of current PFC and MLA payments on current acreage
decisions offarmers. The empirical model is based on expected utility maximization of
wealth (initial wealth plus market returns, government payments, and nonfarm activities). The following reduced-form acreage response equation is estimated:

(3)
where At is current acreage, A t-1 is lagged acreage, Pt is stochastic output price for the
commodity, W t is input price, and W t_1 is wealth. CPt represents government payments
which are conditioned on market conditions (LDP and MLA payments), and DPt denotes
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fixed payments received by the producer. The estimation equations include PFC and
MLA payments and also the indirect effects that PFC payments can have on farmers'
decisions via the farmers' risk aversion. A farmer's level of risk aversion is represented
by the proportion of his insurance bill as compared to his total expenditure. The
PFC-insurance interaction term captures the effect that PFC payments can have on risk
aversion. The empirical model also includes the farm's wealth, calculated as total assets
less total debts, and PFC payments. The authors estimate acreage equations for corn,
soybeans, and wheat. They find that the direct effects of PFC payments on acreage
decisions are positive and significant, except in the wheat acreage decision, though the
magnitude ofthe impact is small. The coefficient ofthe PFC-insurance term in all three
acreage equations is negative though insignificant. Wealth effects are also insignificant.
The overall effect of a dollar increase in PFC payments is to increase corn, soybean,
and wheat acreage by 0.92,0.61, and 0.36 acres respectively corresponding to acreage
elasticities of 0.0317 for corn, 0.0204 for soybeans, and 0.0428 for wheat. MLA effects
on corn acreage are found to be stronger as compared to the effect of PFC payments,
though the effect on soybeans and wheat are not significant. Appendix table A1 summarizes the papers discussed in this section.

Coupling via Credit Constraints
Decoupled payments can influence the investment decisions of farmers by adding to
their wealth, which might enable farmers to save more and therefore increase their
investment. For capital-constrained farmers, decoupled payments improve their creditworthiness and make credit more accessible. Roe, Somwaru, and Diao (2003) examine
the economy-wide effect of decoupled payments on consumption and savings patterns.
First, the paper explores the link between PFC payments and land values using data
from statistical reporting districts in Minnesota from 1994 to 2000. Results indicate a
positive correlation between government payments and land values; between 1994 and
2000, a 10% change in government payments led to a 3.24% change in land values. The
appreciation in land values can affect investment by increasing the access to credit, as
land is used as collateral. Next, the authors examine the effects of PFC payments on
investment under perfect and segmented capital markets using an intertemporal threesector general equilibrium (GE) model. PFC payments are incorporated into the model
as a lump-sum transfer from urban households to the rural households who undertake
agricultural production. The model is calibrated to 19.97 U.S. data. PFC payments are
assumed to be $6.11 billion in 1997, and are paid in every period in perpetuity. The
steady-state solutions of the model with and without (defined as the benchmark) the
PFC payments are compared. With perfectly integrated capital markets, the sole effect
ofPFC payments is on land values, which exceeds the benchmark by 9% in the short run
and by about 8% in the long run. With imperfect capital markets, the rental rate of
capital in agriculture declines by 0.1% in the first 10 years as compared to the benchmark. The effect on rental rate of capital outside agriculture is negligible. The price of
land and hence the value ofland rises. Farmers increase their level of capital stock, and
as they do so, also employ more labor. Thus, higher labor hours are employed in agriculture over the benchmark. Aggregate agricultural production increases by a maximum
of 0.18% over the benchmark, a very small effect. All of these effects occur in the short
run. In the long run, the differences in the rental rates of capital in agriculture and
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outside agriculture are arbitraged away and there is convergence to the benchmark.
Hence, PFC payments do not have any effects in the long run.
Goodwin and Mishra (2006), earlier discussed in the previous section, also empirically
estimate the impact of PFC payments on easing credit constraints faced by farmers.
Credit constraints are represented by the debt-to-asset ratio of the farm. The PFC-Cdebtto-asset ratio) interaction term captures the effect that PFC payments might have on
the farm's financial leverage. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant in the corn, soybean, and wheat acreage equations. Appendix table A2 recapitulates this section's information.

Coupling Through Labor Allocation
Decoupled payments can have a significant effect on farmers' on-farm and off-farm labor
supply decisions. Farmers do not view on-farm and off-farm work as having similar
characteristics. As Key and Roberts (2009) note, farmers can derive nonpecuniary
benefits from farming, and the receipt of decoupled payments leads to an increase in
on-farm labor supply. Another explanation could be that the receipt of decoupled
payments increases farmers' liquidity and hence reduces their reliance on off-farm work.
Ahearn, EI-Osta, and Dewbre (2006) investigate the effect of government payments on
the off-farm labor participation decision offarm operator households using ARMS data
for the years 1996 and 1999 and a bivariate probit approach. They find that PFC, LDP,
and MLA payments, individually and in aggregate, reduce the probability that the
farmer works off the farm. The estimation results for the spouse are more ambiguous.
In an investigation also based on recent ARMS data, Dewbre and Mishra (2002)
estimate the effect that PFC, MLA, LDP, and disaster assistance payments have on the
leisure time and on-farm hours of operators and spouses. The impact of the PFC
payments on on-farm labor hours is negative yet statistically insignificant. PFC
payments have a positive and significant impact on leisure hours though the effect is
very small in magnitude. The authors conclude that PFC payments are decoupled. The
authors also focus on transfer efficiency losses arising from reallocation of farm
resources caused by the government payments and leakages of benefits to nonfarming
landowners. Transfer efficiency is measured as the impact of the payments on the total
income of households. PFC has the lowest transfer efficiency (0.29) for households with
some off-farm income among the payments considered and also the highest transfer
efficiency (0.55) for households with no off-farm income.
Using 2001 ARMS data, EI-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn (2004) estimate the effect of
PFC, LDP, and disaster assistance payments on on- and off-farm labor and total labor
supply. They find that combined payments have a positive effect on on-farm and total
labor hours supplied and a negative effect on off-farm labor supply. Operators increased
their on-farm labor hours while cutting down on both off-farm labor as well as leisure
time. When each government payment is considered individually, PFC payments have
a positive significant impact on on-farm labor hours and a negative significant impact
on off-farm labor hours. No significant effect is found on total labor supply.
Key and Roberts (2009) develop a household model where farmers make labor allocation decisions to maximize utility. It is assumed that farmers derive utility from
consumption, leisure, and nonpecuniary benefits from farming. The authors employ an
additive utility function. Under the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of income ,
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they find that an increase in DP leads to a reallocation of labor toward on-farm work
and away from off-farm work. The explanation for this result is based on the nonpecuniary benefits that farmers receive from farming. Because of the nonpecuniary
benefits, farmers prefer on-farm work to off-farm work for the same wage rate. Using
2002-04 ARMS data, Key and Roberts fmd evidence of nonpecuniary benefits by
empirically estimating the wage differential between on-farm and off-farm work. For the
entire sample, their findings show the off-farm hourly wage rate to be $24 higher than
the on-farm wage rate. Appendix table A3 sums up the points made by the papers cited
in this section.

Coupling via Land Markets
Decoupled payments are passed on to landowners via higher land rents and land values.
This can lead to land remaining in agriculture and also, as mentioned earlier, can make
credit more accessible to farmers. Roe, Somwaru, and Diao (2003) assert that PFC payments lead to an increase in land values, even in the long run. One of the earliest articles
to raise this issue was Schertz and Johnston (1998). The authors conduct a study in four
major agricultural regions: the Great Plains, the Corn Belt, the South, and California.
The study is based on the responses of farm managers or operators to the 1996 FAIR
Act. Based on their discussions with the farm managers, the authors conclude that
owing to their nonstochastic nature, PFC payments inflate land prices and land rents.
PFC payments increase land values as they are attached to the land. In the case of cash
leases, much of the payments pass on to the landowner via increased rents. In the case
of crop share leases, payments create incentives for the landowner to adjust the lease
to take advantage ofthe PFC payments (e.g., in some cases landowners shifted to cash
leases).
Gohin, Guyomard, and Le Mouel (2000) analyze the impact of direct payments on
land and production. They evaluate them in terms of their eligibility to qualify as greenbox payments. The authors use a static partial equilibrium model with two perfectly
competitive agricultural sectors, each producing a single output, with a constant
returns-to-scale production technology. Production in the two sectors depends on the use
of three inputs: an aggregate variable input, a specific primary factor, and a fixed
allocable factor such as land, which is used in both sectors and is in fixed supply. The
domestic support instruments considered include output subsidies, variable input
subsidies, and DP based on the specific factor, and on land. Optimal output supply and
derived input demands are determined by a two-stage profit-maximization process.
Land prices are determined endogenously by the market-clearing condition for land.
Land prices are computed under two alternative assumptions: land homogeneity and
heterogeneity. Comparative-static analysis indicates that the land use and output
supply in each sector depend on both sectors' DP and output subsidy. The effect of the
DP depends on the use of other support measures and the production technology. Two
countries with different production technologies or different factor movements across
sectors will have different impacts from using the same direct support instrument.
Barnard et a1. (2001) analyze the effects of commodity program payments on cropland
values using 2000 county-level farmland value data from ARMS. They estimate hedonic
land price equations with all government payments (which include PFC, LDP, MLA, and
disaster assistance payments) grouped together as a single variable. Results suggest
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that the commodity program payments have a significant effect on cropland values. The
highest proportional effect was in the Heartland region (includes Iowa, Illinois, Indiana,
and parts of Ohio, Minnesota, Missouri, Kentucky, South Dakota, and Nebraska) where
farm commodity programs accounted for 24% of the market value of farmland. Farm
commodity programs also had a similar effect in the Prairie Gateway region (includes
. Kansas, and parts of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Colorado) (23% of
the market value offarmland) and in the Northern Great Plains region (includes North
Dakota, most of South Dakota, and parts of Montana, Minnesota, Wyoming, Colorado,
and Nebraska) (22% of the market value offarmland). Even though all payments have
been grouped together, the authors note that PFC payments are expected to have a
larger impact on land values as compared to the coupled LDP and disaster assistance
payments. This is because the coupled payments can increase production and therefore
increase the demand for other non-land inputs. Consequently, benefits from the coupled
payments may be transferred to other inputs, and not all benefits are capitalized into
higher land values. PFC payments are paid on land, and being lump-sum in nature, they
are not expected to influence production. Hence, all benefits from the PFC payments are
expected to be capitalized into higher land values. In contrast, Goodwin, Mishra, and
Ortalo-Magne (2003a,b) found LDP and disaster assistance payments have a larger
impact on land values as compared to the PFC payments.
Dewbre, Anton, and Thompson (2001) employ the policy evaluation matrix (PEM)
model to study the effects that direct payments (based on land use) have on trade and
their efficiency in providing income support. Since they are based on land use, these DPs
are considered as area payments and are further classified into two types: one requiring
production for eligibility, and the other that land be kept in arable use. The authors also
compare the area payments with market price support, input subsidies, and output
payments. Their paper focuses on the impacts of the support measures through their
incidence on relative prices. The impact of area payments on production, trade, and farm
income arises because of their impact on land prices. The results from model simulation
reveal that the area payments have the smallest effect on trade as compared to the
other three forms of support. Within the area payments, the one requiring no active
production has a smaller effect on trade than the one which requires mandatory production. Market price supports have a smaller impact on trade as compared to the input
subsidies. In fact, input subsidies prove to be the most inefficient form of support in
terms of providing income support, while area payments prove to be the most efficient.
Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) examine the incidence of government payments
on land rents using micro data from the 1992 and 1997 U.S. Census of Agriculture.
Results indicate that government payments had a significant impact on land rents. For
1997, rents increased between $0.33 and $1.55 for each government payment dollar (in
1997 the major component of government payments consisted of payments made under
the PFC program). For 1992, the effect on land rents is smaller, reflecting the temporary
nature of government payments in that year.
Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne (2003a,b) use farm-level data from ARMS to
estimate the determinants of farmland values. While the first study (2003a) uses data
for the years 1998-2001, the second study (2003b) uses data for the years 1998-2000.
The current value of farmland is affected by the sum of the expected future cash flows
discounted according to the risk of these cash flows. Cash flows from the same source
have the same discount factor. The authors consider three sources of future cash flows:
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market returns, government payments (PFC, LDP, and disaster assistance), and the
nonagricultural returns to land. Each government program has been considered
separately in the analysis since programs differ according to support provided. The
uncertainty associated with each program differs. They find that PFC payments have
a positive and significant effect on farmland values; a dollar increase in PFC payments
leads to an increase in per acre land values of $4.94 in the first study, and $4.06 in the
second study.
Frandsen, Gersfelt, and Jensen (2003) employ a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model to analyze the production and trade impacts of decoupling income support
in the EU. The model accounts for the support measures in the CAP and the Agenda
2000 reforms. The model baseline is constructed for the period 1997-2013, and captures
the structure of the domestic support in the EU. The baseline is compared with three
scenarios. Of interest to us is the scenario where all domestic support is converted into
a single region-specific decoupled payment to land. Under this scenario, there is a
substantial increase of75.1% in land prices for the EU15 as a whole. All individual EU
countries also display increases in land prices. Other results are a decrease in the
production of wheat, other grains, oilseeds, and bovine animals by 6.9%,5.6%,8.9%, and
11%, respectively. Most affected are plant-based fibers, such as cotton whose production
decreases by 63%. These decreases are reflective of the high level of domestic support
enjoyed by these commodities under Agenda 2000.
Gohin (2006) analyzes the impact of the 2003 CAP Mid-Term Review (MTR) under
two different assumptions about the modeling of Agenda 2000 direct payments. The first
is based on the standard approach employed in other studies that have examined the
effect of CAP MTR reforms, under which there is full capitalization of the arable crop
direct payments by 2008, and beef premia are not limited by any maximum limit. Under
the second assumption, there is a 50% capitalization of the arable crop direct payments
by 2008, and beef premia are paid on a limited number of animals. Under both assumptions, direct payments are based on land use and therefore increase land rents (by 164%
under the first assumption and 38.5% under the second). A static, single-country, multisector GE model of the EU15 economy with perfect competition in all markets and
constant-returns-to-scale technology is employed. Gohin focuses on the soft wheat sector
for the analysis. The model is calibrated to 1995 data from Eurostat. Policy variables
were calibrated using FEOGAlWTO notifications. Under the CAP MTR scenario,
Agenda 2000 arable crop direct payments are reduced by 90%, the slaughter premium
on adult animals is reduced by 80%, and the suckler cow premium and the special beef
premium are reduced by 50% and 90%, respectively. It is also assumed that the SFP has
no market effects. The simulation results indicate that under both assumptions, land
rents decrease by at least 80%.
There are also negative impacts on arable crop and beef production. The results with
the first assumption are similar to findings reported by the other studies: soft wheat and
beef production decrease by 1.6% and 3.6%, respectively. The results with the second
assumption are in the same direction but the magnitude of the impact differs, with a
decrease of 7.3% in soft wheat production and a 1.2% decrease in beef production. The
varying results suggest that the impacts of the CAP MTR are sensitive to the modeling
of the Agenda 2000 direct payments. Another conclusion that can be drawn from the
results of the alternative modeling of the Agenda 2000 arable crop direct payments is
that the payments seem to have a moderate degree of coupling.
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Goodwin and Mishra (2006) (discussed in earlier sections) also assess the impact of
PFC payments on the allocation ofland across alternate practices such as conservation
reserves, pasture, fallow, and other idling practices. They find that PFC payments lead
to less idling ofland. Further, the authors investigate whether PFC payments led to the
acquisition of new land. Their findings show that PFC payments may lead to more land
ownership transactions, though the effect is not significant. Appendix table A4 recaps
these papers on coupling through land markets.

Coupling from Farmer Expectations
on Future Policy Changes
Farmers form expectations on future decoupled payments. The latter are often based on
historical behavior which then "couples" current production decisions to these expected
future payments. Lagerkvist and Olson (2002) analyze anticipatory adjustments made
by farmers to the 1996 FAIR Act using a sample of Minnesota farmers. Both the timing
and the size of the support are considered to be stochastic. The farmer has well-defined
probability distribution functions for the timing and the size of the reform. The farmer
maximizes net receipts subject to a binding dividend constraint derived from the budget
constraint of the farm business. Assuming the farmer continuously updates his information, the authors convert the dynamic stochastic problem into two deterministic control
problems for the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The solution indicates that the prereform debt-to-asset ratio differs from the post-reform ratio. The former includes an
additional term which captures the anticipatory optimal debt adjustment to a future
reform offarm policy. The adjustment is comprised of the expectation effect (relating to
the uncertainty in the size of the reform) and the timing effect (relating to the uncertainty in the timing of the reform). The authors estimate the pre-reform and post-reform
debt-to-asset ratios for an anticipated reduction in support using data from the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association records for 1989-1998
using the generalized method of moments estimator. The empirical results indicate the
presence of anticipatory adjustments in the debt-to-asset ratio due to the expected
change in the post-reform support.
In a related investigation, Lagerkvist (2005) applies the framework in Lagerkvist and
Olson (2002) to analyze the impacts ofthe CAP MTR reform of the area payments on the
incentives for farmland investment among Swedish farmers. The paper provides an
explanation for the fluctuations in farmland investment based on agricultural policy
uncertainty. The required rate of return (ROR) for farmland investment is used to
capture farmland investment incentives. The short-term ROR includes the impact of
incentive adjustment to a future reform in the area payments. Numerical analysis based
on survey data from a sample of Swedish farmers shows that the pre-reform ROR under
timing uncertainty is less than the ROR with complete certainty. Further, the prereform ROR under both timing and post-reform area payment uncertainty is less than
the ROR under only timing uncertainty under a nonpositive correlation between the
timing of the reform and the post-reform payment.
Sumner (2003) analyzes the impact of an expected base update on the supply response
of program crops by constructing the degree of linkage between future payments that
might involve base updating and current production, and then evaluating how this is
affected by a current update. The degree oflinkage depends among other factors on the
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probability that the program remains operative in the future, the probability that an
update occurs, and how the new base affects future payments relative to the current
program. The degree oflinkage is sensitive to the probabilities and discount factor used.
Under a high degree oflinkage, payments such as the direct payments or CCP, which
are affected by base updating in the future, strongly influence current production.
McIntosh, Shogren, and Dohlman (2007) use experimental economics to study the
effects of CCP and base acre updating on supply response under price and policy
uncertainty. Each participant is endowed with "tokens," representing base acres to be
invested in either a "Blue" option (denoting a program crop) or a "Red" option (representing a nonprogram crop or a crop that has not been planted earlier), or a combination
of the two. These allocation decisions are made under three situations: (a) participants
face only price uncertainty (baseline case), (b) they face price uncertainty and receive
CCP (CCP case), and (c) they face price and policy uncertainty and also receive CCP
(policy risk case). The results indicate that CCP increased the investment in the
program crop (Blue option). There was a 5.43% shift in base acres toward the program
crop with the CCP case as compared to the baseline. Under the policy risk case there
was a shift of 7.92% in base acres toward the program crop. These results provide
evidence that both the CCP and the possibility of future base updating do create some
incentives for farmers to plant more of the program crops than that indicated by market
returns.
Coble, Miller, and Hudson (2008) use survey data from Iowa and Mississippi to analyze
what expectations farmers have from future farm bills, including expectations regarding
future base update. In the survey, they ask questions regarding the probability of base
and program yield update for DP and CCP, whether payment rates will change or
remain the same, and iffarmers made any adjustments in acreage or input use to affect
future program payments. On average, the surveyed farmers believed there was a 40%
chance that base or yield updates would be allowed, though only 17% of those surveyed
said they would make adjustments in acreage planted or input use. The authors also use
a censored probit model with the dependent variable as the willingness to accept (WTA)
a one-time payment in lieu of an opportunity to update base. The WTA captures the
value placed by farmers on the opportunity to update base. Greater expectation of an
update and a higher percentage offarm income were found to increase the WTA. The
mean WTA across the two states was $48.16 per acre.
Using a stochastic dynamic programming approach, Bhaskar and Beghin (2008)
analyze the impact offarmer expectations about the possibility to update base acreage
and program yield on a farmer's acreage and fertilizer use decision under price, yield,
and policy uncertainty. They consider a risk-averse farmer producing corn, earning
income from the sale of his crop and government payments. There is policy uncertainty
about the possibility of base acreage and program yield update in the 2007 Farm Bill.
The farmer's subjective probability about the expected updates is discretized into five
values, between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.25. The farmer maximizes the present value
of expected utility by choosing acreage and fertilizer use during 2003-11, taking into
account the possibility of a base acreage and program yield update. The choice variables,
the acreage planted and fertilizer use, are discretized into four values each. Price and
yield shocks are the state variables which are discretized into eight and two states each.
There are two possible income streams in 2007-2011-one when updates are allowed
and the other when no updates are allowed. The farmer weighs the two possible future
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income streams with their prior subjective probability of updates. In this way, the latter
affects the acreage and fertilizer use decisions in the 2003-06 period. The results are
presented in terms of the average of the optimal planted acreage over 2003-06, and the
average yield resulting from optimal fertilizer use over 2003-06. The authors find that
optimal acreage and yield in 2003-06 are weakly increasing in the subjective probability
of the updates. They also find that the maximum percentage increase in acreage is
6.25% and the maximum percentage increase in yield is 0.134%. In sum, the effects
through expectations appear tangible although small. The summary for these papers on
expectations is presented in appendix table A5.

Other Coupling Linkages and Allocative Effects
A few papers do not fit within the conceptual underpinnings of the previous taxonomy.
Using some reduced forms, Adams et a1. (2001) econometrically estimate the effect of
PFC and MLA payments on the total area planted in 11 states for wheat, corn, sorghum,
barley, oats, cotton, rice, and soybeans, using annual state-level data for the years
1997-2001. The authors test two hypotheses: first, whether PFC and MLA payments
affect the total area planted, and second, whether PFC and MLA payments have the
same effect as market returns and marketing loans on the total area planted. Based on
the empirical results, PFC and MLA payments do have some effect on the area planted.
Empirical results for testing the second hypothesis do not provide a clear indication
whether PFC and MLA payments have different effects on area planted than market
returns and marketing loans. The authors conclude that their results provide only weak
evidence that PFC and MLA payments have some effect on the total area planted. The
results in the study are based on the assumptions that the elasticities are the same
across states and on na'ive expectations on the part of the farmers in the computation
of expected market returns and expected MLA payments. A similar analysis is
conducted by Beckman and Wailes (2005) who assess the impact of direct payments and
CCP in the 2002 FSRI Act on acreage supply response for rice. They find that OPs are
decoupled while a $1 increase in CCP per year increases rice area harvested by 956.29
thousand acres for the six major U.S. rice-producing states.
Guyomard, Le MouEH, and Gohin (2004) compare the effectiveness of four support
mechanisms (an output subsidy, a land subsidy, and decoupled payments with and
without mandatory production, OPm and OP, respectively) on achieving four policy
objectives: providing income support, increasing the number of farmers, reducing the
negative externalities from non-land input usage, and keeping trade effects at a minimum. A support mechanism is considered to be more efficient than the other support
mechanisms if, for the same budgetary costs, it has a higher impact on the four policy
objectives identified above. The analytical model is based on three equilibrium equations
representing equilibrium in the output and land markets and an entry-exit condition.
OP does not appear in any of the three equations. It only achieves the policy objective
of providing income support. OPm, on the other hand, has a positive effect on the
number of farmers, though its effect on output price and land price is ambiguous. The
authors find that none of the four policy instruments dominate in terms of efficiency in
all four policy goals. OP is most efficient when it comes to supporting farmers' income
with the least distortion of trade. Land subsidies are the most efficient in reducing
the negative externalities from non-land input use, while decoupled payments with
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mandatory production are the most efficient in maintaining or increasing the number
of farmers.
Chau and de Gorter (2005) examine the effects of decoupled payments on exit decisions of farmers. It is their contention that decoupled payments subsidize production
and at times cross-subsidize exports. In the model constructed by the authors, producers
receive both coupled and decoupled support. The coupled payment is modeled as an ad
valorem subsidy, which is incorporated in the price they receive for exports. The
decoupled payment is a lump-sum payment, DP. The producers incur fixed and variable
costs. The fixed costs are assumed to be firm specific. The model results indicate that
DP allows producers to cover fixed costs, thereby permitting those with higher fixed
costs, who would have exited otherwise, to remain in production. Thus, direct payments
do not affect an individual producer's output; rather, they affect aggregate output and
exports by influencing the exit decision of producers. The model is calibrated to 1998
U.S. wheat production to compare the effects ofPFC and LDP payments. Fixed costs are
assumed to be normally distributed. In the long run when it is possible to exit, the
removal of PFC payments causes 3% of the producers to exit, leading to a reduction in
output and exports.
Serra et al. (2005b) examine the effect of decoupling of support on the environment
by analyzing the effect of post-MacSharry CAP reforms on the use of pest control inputs
in the cereal, oilseed, and protein (COP) crop sector. The model specifies damage abatement functions to capture the contribution of the pest control inputs in reducing crop
damage. The authors derive expressions for the elasticity of the demand of pest control
inputs with respect to price support measures and per hectare compensatory payments.
They hypothesize and find that the input response to DP is less than the response to
price, using a sample of French farms from the Farm Accounting Data Network for the
period 1994-1999. The model is then shocked with CAP reforms (decrease in cereal
intervention prices, and increase in area payments). Area payments for oilseeds and
protein crops are reduced. These policy changes result in a reduction in the use of crop
protection inputs by a little more than 3%, and a shift away from oilseed/protein crop
acreage toward cereal acreage. When area payments are combined into the SFP, the use
of crop protection inputs is reduced by 11%. Cereal acreage falls while oilseed and
protein crop acreage remains almost constant. Appendix table A6 summarizes these
last papers.

Conclusion
There has been a move toward decoupled support away from coupled support consistent
with the 1994 URAA. However, as seen above, decoupled payments do influence
farmers' decisions. Our review identifies five major coupling channels of decoupled payments: (a) they affect the risk faced by farmers, either by reducing their level of risk
aversion (wealth effects) or by reducing the risk they face (insurance effects); (b) they
ease credit constraints faced by farmers; (c) they affect the labor allocation decisions of
farm households; (d) they alter land values, rents, and land prices; and (e) they influence
farmers' decisions through expectations about future payments. Less often mentioned,
decoupled payments can also influence the entry and exit decisions of farmers and have
some effect on the environment by influencing input usage.
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Although decoupled payments are not fully "decoupled," as the research suggests that
they influence farmers' decisions through the channels identified above, the magnitude
of these impacts was found to be small in most cases. One exception is with respect to
land markets. Since most decoupled payments (be it the PFC, direct payments, or the
CAP area payments) are land based and nonstochastic, they tend to be capitalized into
higher land values which increase land rents and prices. This feature could lead to land
remaining in agricultural use rather than being converted into non agrarian alternate
uses. Wealth effects, though positive, are small in magnitude, and insurance effects are
more important than wealth effects in determining the impact of decoupled payments.
Decoupled payments also influence crop choice, since the payments vary by crops, and
some crops are not eligible to receive payments.
An important and unresolved issue is to identify the cumulative impact of these
individually small effects coming from each coupling mechanism. Could it be that when
combined together, risk aversion, wealth effects, credit constraints, expectations, base
update, and linkages through input markets have a substantial impact on production?
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) have econometrically analyzed the cumulative effects of risk
aversion, wealth effects, and credit constraints. They left out expectations of future
decoupled payments, base update, and labor market linkages, and captured risk aversion
in a roundabout way without explicit parameterization. Numerical methods would allow
a more explicit characterization of risk aversion and account for expectations and base
and yield updates.
Decoupled payments have been a step toward reducing the distortions caused by
domestic farm subsidies, but there is scope for further decoupling. This can be achieved
by changing eligibility requirements in some cases (e.g., removing the restriction that
fruits and vegetables are not eligible for payments in the case of direct payments in the
United States), by requiring eligibility to be satisfied at the farm level (e.g., area payments in the CAP have base acreage restriction at the national or regional level, which
still creates incentives at the farm level to increase acreage), and by ensuring that the
eligibility to receive payments does not change after the inception of the decoupled
payment program.
The implementation of decoupled programs calls into question the current definition
of the green-box payments in the WTO. There is a need for reevaluating the eligibility
criteria of the green-box payments. Right now, eligibility criteria do not take into
account the farmer's response under uncertainty, or the fact that the impact of similarly
designed programs can differ across countries, and even across sectors within a country
(Gohin, Guyomard, and Le Moutil, 2000). Also, some eligibility criteria are ambiguous
(e.g., it is not specified if eligibility criteria should be satisfied at the farm level, at the
sub-sectoral level, or at the sectoralleveD.
[Received March 2008;final revision received February 2009.]
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Econometric estimation using the
2-step estimation procedure" and
farm-level data

Elasticity Otherwise Noted
Output:

Com
Durumwheat
Other cereals
Oilseeds
Acreage: Com
Durumwheat
Other cereals
Oilseeds

0.014
0.072
0.087
0.015
0.014
0.056
0.088
0.005

The specific decoupled payment is identified below in brackets.
Italicized elasticities reflect statistical insignificance.
, Acreage is aggregate U.S. acreage of seven crops receiving PFC payments: com, grain sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, upland cotton, and rice.
d The incentive price is defined as the truncated expected price (truncation of the price distribution at the loan rate) less the price risk premium. The CCP payments reduce the risk premium
which increases the incentive price of commodities.
• Output is a quantity index that includes wheat, com, grain sorghum, and soybeans. This definition of output also applies to Serra et al. (2006).
f The acreage elasticities here include the effect of the PFC payments on the level of risk aversion and on the financial leverage of the farm. In the paper, the coefficients on the PFCinsurance and PFC-(debt-to-asset ratio) interaction terms are found to be statistically insignificant.
g Following Shonkwiler and Yen (1999).
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Table A2. Imperfect Capital Market/Credit Constraint Effects of Decoupled Payments

-§

Methodology
Papers'
Roe, Somwaru & Diao (2003)
[PFC)

Goodwin & Mishra (2006)
[PFC]

Modeling Approach
Intertemporal3-sector CGE model

Empirical/Numerical
Model is calibrated to 1997 U.S. data

Elasticity Otherwise Noted b

r in DP by $6.11 billion

C

=>

Ag'l production in the U.S. r by a maximum of 0.18%
Rental rate on ag'l capitall by 0.1%
Land price, labor hours & capital-labor ratio in ag r
Expected utility maximization

Econometric estimation using the 2-step
estimation procedure and farm-level
data

Acreage: d Com
Soybeans
Wheat

0.0344
0.0246
0.0333

The specific decoupled payment is identified below in brackets.
Italicized elasticities reflect statistical insignificance.
, The paper assumes that $6.11 billion is paid to farmers as PFC payments in 1997, and that these payments are made in each period oftime from 1997 in perpetuity. These effects occur
in the short run and are compared to the baseline model (without PFC payments).
d See footnote f to table Al above.
a

b

~
I:l...

::...
~

~

8

-§

it
~
~
~

§

~

1;;"

.'"

-'"
. j::.

VI

o

~

Table A3. Labor Market Effects of Decoupled Payments

~
w
§;

Methodology

'0

Papers'

Modeling Approach

Empirical/Numerical

Elasticity Otherwise Noted b

Ahearn, EI Osta & Dewbre (2006)
[PFC)

Labor-leisure model

Econometric estimation using
Probability of off-farm participation 1:
Operator
-0.016
maximum likelihood for off-farm labor
participation model and farm
Spouse
-0.003
household data

Dewbre & Mishra (2002)
[PFC)

Farm household resource allocation
model

Econometric estimation using
ordinary least squares for leisure
demand and on-farm labor supply
models and farm household data

El-Osta, Mishra & Ahearn (2004)
[PFC]

Key & Roberts (2009)
[direct payments)

Labor-leisure model

Labor-leisure model with
nonpecuniary benefits from farming

Econometric estimation using
weighted least squares for on-farm
and total labor supply models,
weighted maximum likelihood for offfarm labor supply model, and farm
household data

On-farm labor hours
Total labor hours
Off-farm labor hours

Comparative statics

i DP => i on-farm labor supply and
1 off-farm labor supply

The specific decoupled payment is identified below in brackets.
Italicized elasticities reflect statistical insignificance.
C The elasticity was calculated for farmers who had some off-farm work.
d The elasticity was calculated for farmers who had no off-farm work.
• The on-farm work hours model was estimated for farmers who had some off-farm work.
r The elasticity has been taken from Abler and Blandford (2005).
a

b

Leisure hours_Off-farm: C
Operator
Spouse
Leisure hours: d
Operator
Spouse
On-farm labor hours: •
Operator
Spouse

0.0019
0.0011
0.0007
0.0009

-0.0013
-0.0109
0.0172
0.0122
-0.05 f
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Table A4. Land Market Effects of Decoupled Payments

1:;

ir
....

Methodology
Papers a

Modeling Approach

Gohin, Guyomard & Le MouiH (2000)
[direct payments based on land)

Two-sector partial equilibrium
model

Dewbre, AntOn & Thompson (2001)
[area payments) b

PEM crop model'

Goodwin, Mishra & Ortalo-Magne (2003a)e
[PFC]

Net present value model which
includes individual government
payments and farm location

I:>
;::;

Empirical/Numerical
N/A
Policy simulation experiments
based on 1998 data

Elasticity Otherwise Noted
TDP '* Tin land allocation '*
Tin output supply
Production impact ratio: d
EU
U.S.
Mexico
Trade impact ratio:
EU
U.S.
Mexico

Land values:
Econometric estimation using
probability-weighted bootstrapping
T$1 in DP per acre '*
procedure and farm-level data

to
~
;:,..
S·

0.06
0.09
0.15
0.04
0.07
0.14
Tby $4.06 per acre
Tby $4.94 per acre

Goodwin, Mishra & Ortalo-Magne (2003b)e
[PFC)

~
Tby $0.33 to $1.55
per acre

Roberts, Kirwan & Hopkins (2003)
[PFC, LDP, and other payments]

Model ofland rents equal to
expected returns less payments
to factors other than land and
including government payments

Econometric estimation using
ordinary least squares and farmlevel data

Land rents:
T$1 in G f per acre '*

Roe, Somwaru & Diao (2003)
[PFC)

Intertemporal 3-sector CGE model

Model is calibrated to 1997 U.S.
data

Tin DP by $6.11 billion g '* land values Tby 8.3%
in the long run and by 9% in the short run

Frandsen, Gersfelt & Jensen (2003)
[single uniform payment based on land]

Multi-regional, static CGE model
under certainty

Calibrated to Global Trade
Analysis Project database with
adjustments made to capture the
features of the Agenda 2000
reforms

Land price Tby 75%

Econometric estimation using the
2-step estimation procedure and
farm-level data

Land idling h

Goodwin & Mishra (2006)
[PFC]

I:>..

Expected utility maximization

~
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Table A4. Continued

N

~

Methodology
Papers

Modeling Approach

Gohin (2006)
[Agenda 2000 arable crop direct payment)

Empirical/Numerical

Multi-sector static CGE model

Calibrated to 1995 Eurostat data and
FEOGAlWTO notifications

Elasticity Otherwise Noted

i:!:
N

~

Land rent:
J DPby 90% ;}

'C

Jby=80%

• The specific decoupled payment is identified below in brackets.
b The area payment requires that land be in arable use. The paper also considers area payments which require mandatory production. The results here provide a lower bound.
, The PEM model stands for Policy Evaluation Matrix model, and was developed by the OECD.
d The production and trade impact ratios measure the effect on production and trade of a given change in support provided by area payments relative to the estimated impact on production
and trade of the same monetary change in market price support.
• The Goodwin, Mishra & Ortalo-Magne (2003a) study uses data for the years 1998-2000, while their 2003b study uses data for the years 1998-2001. The explanatory variables used in
the two studies also differ.
r G includes, among others, PFC and LDP payments.
• The paper assumes that $6.11 billion is paid to farmers as PFC payments in 1997, and that these payments are made in each period oftime from 1997 in perpetuity.
h Land idling refers to the number of acres not harvested; an alternative measure used was the number of acres not cropped. The elasticity for this measure was -0.16.

Table AS. Expectation Effects of Decoupled Payments
Methodology
Papers·

Modeling Approach

Empirical/Numerical

Effects and Magnitude When Available

Sumner (2003)
[direct payments)

Present value calculation

Parameterization of subjective
probabilities

Lagerkvist (2005)
[area payments)

Investment decision model under timing
and support uncertainty

Numerical analysis of the model using Expected J in DP ~ farmers become more
inclined to overinvest
a survey of Swedish farmers

McIntosh, Shogren & Dohlman (2007)
[CCP)

Random-effects model under price and
policy uncertainty and DARA preferences

Estimation using data obtained from
an experiment

Shift; in base acres toward program crop of
7.92%'

Coble, Miller & Hudson (2008)
[direct payments and CCP)

Censored probit model

Estimation using survey data from
Iowa and Mississippi farmers

Willingness to accept a one-time payment in
lieu of an opportunity to update =$48.16/acre

Bhaskar & Beghin (2008)
[direct payments and CCP)

Acreage and nitrogen application choice
under price, yield, and policy uncertainty

Numerical analysis using discrete
state and choice seta

Maximum increase in acreage of 6.25%
Maximum increase in yield of 0.134%

Degree oflinkage between future DP and
current production 0.27 h

=
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~

~
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The specific decoupled payment is identified below in brackets.
b The value of the degree oflinkage is sensitive to the assumptions made while constructing it. (See "Coupling from Farmer Expectations on Future Policy Changes" section in text for details.
, Each participant is endowed with "tokens," representing base acres. The participant has to invest the tokens in either a "Blue" option or a "Red" option, or a combination ofthe two. Blue
tokens represent a program crop, while a red token represents a nonprogram crop or a program crop which the farmer has not planted earlier.
a
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Table A6. Other Effects of Decoupled Payments

~

Methodology
Papers·

Modeling Approach/Mechanism b

Empirical/Numerical

Elasticity Otherwise Noted C

Adams et al. (2001)
[PFC and MLA]

(see footnote b)

Guyomad, Le Mouel & Gohin (2004)
[lump-sum payments]

One-sector static model under certainty
(DPm influences the entry-exit decision
of farmers by requiring production for
eligibility; DP is fully decoupled)·

Serra et al. (2005b)
[area payments]

Dual model of technology (the optimal use Econometric estimation using Zellner's
of pesticides depends on land allocation
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
which is affected by area payments)
and farm-level data

Pesticide use in:
Cereals
Oilseeds & protein crops

0.3549
0.3919

Chau & de Gorter (2005)
[PFC]

One-sector static model under certainty
(DP influences entry-exit decision by
enabling farmers to cover fixed costs)

Model calibrated to 1998 U.S. wheat
sector

Output
Exports

0.034
0.106

Beckman & Wailes (2005)
[CCP]

Nerlove model of supply response
(see footnote b)

Econometric estimation using ordinary
least squares and state-level data

Acreage:' Rice

0.197'

Goodwin & Mishra (2006) h

Expected utility maximization
(see footnote b)

Econometric estimation using the
2-step estimation procedure and farmlevel data

Acreage:

0.0317
0.0204
0.0428

[PFC]

Econometric estimation using mixed
estimation methods and state-level
data
N/A

Acreage d

0.026

~
;:,.

::;.

Tin DP '* Tin total profit
Tin DPm '* Tin number of farmers

Corn
Soybeans
Wheat

The specific decoupled payment is identified below in brackets.
b The mechanism by which the particular DP affects the different variables is identified. In the cases of Adams et al. (2001), Beckman and Wailes (2005), and Goodwin and
Mishra (2006), the exact mechanism is not identified; only the effects ofDP are measured.
C Italicized elasticities reflect statistical insignificance.
d Acreage is the aggregate acreage of 7 crops across 11 states.
e DP is decoupled payment without mandatory production, and DPm is decoupled payment with mandatory production.
, Acreage harvested in Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Missouri for long- and medium-grain rice.
, Short-run elasticity.
h The elasticity derived here does not include the effectofPFC payments on the risk-averse nature offarmers or on credit constraints faced by farmers. In the paper, these effects
are defined to be the "direct" effects of the PFC payments.
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